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Professor Tullock (1981), in trying to understand the results in my (1981) 
paper on lobbying and welfare, has raised issues that require further 
clarification and analysis. For brevity’s sake, I shall concentrate here on the 
essentials, leaving minor remarks of Tullock’s aside. 
(1) The specific case of lobbying which I addressed originally was tariff- 
seeking by pr,otectionist lobbies: so that the tariff would be endogenous. I 
then showed that one could not argue, in this instance, that an exogenously- 
specified tariff at x”/, was necessarily welfare-superior to an endogenous tariff 
at x0%.’ All other forms of lobbying were excluded, of course. 
(2) Tullock argues that this result obtains because he and Krueger (1974) 
think, whereas I do not, that tariff rcvcnucs can be wasted. As it happens. 
Krueger (1974) made no such assumption. She explicitly compared. in her 
analysis of the specific cast of premium-seeking for import quotas aIrcad> 
in place, quotas (with such premium-seeking) with tariffs that had no 
corresponding revenue-seeking or, for that matter, any waste resulting from 
the government directly expending the tariff revenue. Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1980) were the first to introduce the revenue-seeking concept and 
to argue that it was wholly inappropriate for Krueger to compare tariffs and 
quotas on the assumption that the latter gave rise to fill premium-seeking 
whereas the former gave rise to zero revenue-seeking! 
*Thanks are due to the National Science Foundation Grant No. NSF SCS-8-25401 for 
support of the research underlying this note. Conversations with John Wilson and Richard 
Brecher, and correspondence with Gordon Tullock, have led to improvements over the first 
draft of this note. 
‘Incidentally, since this suggested counter-intuitively that lobbying for a tariB was welfare- 
improving, I also proceeded to show that one could decompose the overall loss from the 
endogenous tariff, vis-a-vis free trade, in an alternative manner which would always sign the 
‘normal’ cost of protection and the lobbying cost agreeably. Tullock seems to have missed this 
section; it was not present in some of the earlier drafts of my paper which he saw in personal 
correspondence. 
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(3) Since Tullock raises the question of wastage resulting from revenues in 
connection with the impact of tariff seeking, let me first clarify that it is 
extremely important here to distinguish among three different ways in which 
revenues can be (wholly or fractionally) wasted. (i) In revenue-seeking, the 
waste is caused because lobbies seek a share in the revenue disposal and, in 
competition, the value of the factor services expended in revenue-seeking will 
equal the revenues lobbied for. (ii) Alternatively, the government may 
directly spend revenues on purchasing factor services (e.g. in hiring 
bureaucrats), but the resulting governmental ‘output’ or consumption is held 
to be worth less than the revenues. (iii) Finally, the government may directly 
spend revenues on purchasing goods, in which case one may again regard 
some or all governmental consumption as wasteful and having zero social 
value. The first two cases are qualitatively equivalent. But the third is not, 
since the relationship between the tariff-inclusive goods prices and factor 
prices ceases to be unique in the first two cases, even with the standard 
restrictions, when complete specialization can ensue as in the negative- 
shadow-factor-prices case at issue in my (1980) analysis. Let me distinguish 
therefore between case 1 where the revenues cause waste because of revenue- 
seeking and case 2 where the waste arises because government spends 
revenues on goods and this is deemed to have zero value. 
Case 1: Revenue-seeking* 
Before I turn to what I consider to be Tullock’s way of looking at the 
problem of tariff-seeking, let me stress that I would myself insist that the two 
different kinds of lobbying - tariff-seeking to impose, say, a protectionist tariff, 
and revenue-seeking to seek the resulting tariff revenues - be kept distinct. It 
can, in fact, be shown that each of these two lobbying activities can yield the 
paradoxical conclusion that lobbying may be welfare-improving. 
To see this best, consider fig. 1 which shows both tariff-seeking and 
revenue-seeking. Free trade would be at P*, with AB the production 
possibility curve. P^ is where an exogenous tariff would take the economy. An 
endogenous tariff at the same rate, resulting from lobbying, would take the 
economy to p where the tariff-inclusive price line is tangent to A’B’ which is 
the production possibility curve net of resources used up in tariff-seeking. 
Since p is to the right of P, and the world price ratio in this small economy 
is WP, it is clear that the economy is better off. The paradox Tullock is 
unhappy with is seen. 
‘Or, equivalently, the case where the government spends tariff revenues directly on factor 
services and these are assumed to amount to socially worthless output or consumption. 










B”’ B’ B Goad 1 
Fig. 1. (AB: production possibility curve without any lobbying; A’B’: production possibility 
curve with tariff-seeking; A’.‘, B’*‘: production possibility curve with both tariff-seeking and 
revenue-seeking.) 
Now, introduce revenue-seeking (For simplicity, I assume that the level of 
tariff-seeking is exogenous to the introduction of revenue-seeking.) The tariff 
at ?’ yields revenues which trigger lobbying for some of these revenues. 
Following Bhagwati and Srbivasan (1980) one can solve for the resulting 
equilibrium. Let this be at P where the tariff-inclusive price line is tangent 
now to production possibility curve A r.rEY~r which reflects factor endowments 
net of those *used up in both the tariff-seeking and rexenue-seeking lobbies. 
As drawn, P yields a yet further gain, vis-a-vis P. As Bhagwati and 
Srinivasan (1980) note, in the Komiya-Salter yodel they use, equilibrium at 
a point of incomplete specialization such as P implies that all revenues are 
not lobbied for.3 
On the other hand, as I now read Tullock, he would like to ask a different 
question: what is the rank-ordering between tariff-seeking (i.e. an endogenous 
3In their fig. 2 (1980, p. 1076), the fraction of the total revenue that is lobbied for and which 
then equals the market-valued waste of resources is clearly shown for an arbitrary revenue- 
seeking equilibrium such as ? above. This fraction will vary along the Rybczynski line drawn 
through P” and P” in fig. I above. 
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tariff) with 100% revenue-seeking and an exogenous tariff with 100(x revenue- 
seeking? Must my (1980) conclusion that an endogenous tariff may be 
welfare-superior to an exogenous tariff at an identical rate, both being 
considered without any revenue-seeking or other assumption of direct 
go\crnmcnt waste. bc rc\,crscd if I()()“,, r-c\,cnuc-seeking is admitted as part 01‘ 
this comparison? In fig. 1, therefore, he ought to be comparing (i) an 
exogenous tariff at P^ with full revenue-seeking (or equivalently, with the 
government directly wasting resources through buying factor service2 
towards no socially valuable purpose) vis-a-k (ii) an endogenous tariff at P 
with full revenue-seeking. If one does that, then Tullock seems to assume 
that the ‘private’ ecznomy will operate on the budget line P^C in case (i) and 
on the budget line PC in case (ii): the latter is then dominated by the former. 
But, unfortunately, even this cannot be maintained. For, if indeed the 
Rybczynski line lies in the stripped zone of negative shadow factor prices, full 
revenue-seeking will simply mean that the economy will specialize completely 
on good 1. It is then still possible fo, full revenue-seeking to yield higher 
welfare than at c^ in case (i) and at C in case (ii), and, regardless, for the 
welfare level in case (ii) to exceed that in case (i), thus sustaining my (1980) 
paradox that an endogenous tariff may be superior to an exogenous tariff at 
the same rate.4 
Case 2: Direct waste on goods 
Where instead the government directly spends all revenue, on goods, and 
the entire resulting governmental consumption is regarded as socially 
worthless, the endogenous tariff (combined with this assumption) will indeed 
lead ‘private’ consumption to c and the exogenous tariff (combined with this 
assumption) to C. The paradox of the latter being inferior to the former will 
not arise. 
Tullock’s contention therefore would be necessarily correct if he made all 
of the following three assumptions: that the government directly wastes 
revenues, that all revenues are wasted, and that the waste is occurring wholly 
through government expenditure on goods rather than factor services5 
Needless to say, therefore, the possibility of my (1980) paradox is by no 
means ruled out if ‘wastage of revenues’ is simply admitted into the analysis. 
In particular, I should reemphasise that I find it highly improbable that all 
revenues of the government lead directly or via revenue-seeking to fully 
matching waste of resources any more than I would consider it agreeable to 
assume that no revenues are so wasted. (Also, I should stress, as I did in 
&See Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1980, p. 1081, footnote 16). 
‘Tullock has pointed out in private correspondence that his view is that in reality all 
governmental revenue is not wasted. If so, the conditions for ruling out the paradox at issue are 
not satisfied. 
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relation to case (l), that it is important to keep tariff-seeking and revenue 
waste analytically separate. If one does that in case (2) one goes in fig. 1 
from c^ to ? with tariff-seeking alone and with no wastage of revenues 
assumed. Then one goes from ? to c when wastage of all revenues through 
governmental purchase of goods is introduced.) 
(4) Much of the confusion in this literature on lobbying can be cleared up 
if we focus on the true nature of the activities being analyzed. In my view, 
the essential nature of the activities such as lobbying, evasion, etc. is that 
they are ways of making a profit (or rather, an income) by undertaking 
activities which are directly unproductive, i.e. they yield pecuniary returns 
but do not produce goods or services that enter a utility function directly or 
indirectly via increased production or availability to the economy of goods 
that enter a utility function.’ Insofar as such activities use real resources, they 
result in a contraction of the availability set open to the economy. Thus, for 
example, tariff-seeking lobbying, tariff evasion, and premium-seeking for 
lvi\cti import liccnscs arc alI privately profi~ablu activities. Houcwx. thcit 
direct ‘output’ is simply zero in terms of the flow of goods and services 
entering a conventional utility function. 
Functionally, the DUP activities can be classified as in fig. 2, which is 
constructed on the assumption that the DUP activities are generated by 
policy-intervention-imposed distortions - though, they can equally be 
generated by optimal policy interventions (as when smuggling is around an 
optimal tariff) or without policy intervention at all (as in Tullock’s case of 
theft). The functional classification in fig. 2 divides the DUP activities into 3 
classes: (a) distortion-seeking DUPs, such as tariff-seeking analyzed in my 
1980 paper and Tullock’s comment thereon; (b) distortion-triggered DUP 
lobbying, and (c) distortion-evading DUPs. The latter two, of course, 
immediately imply that the economy begins with a distortion that triggers the 
DUP activity: hence they represent an intrinsically second-best problem, with 
possible paradoxes of the type that Tullock is addressing with puzzlement. 
In this schema, Krueger’s (1974) generic class of ‘rent-seeking’ activities 
comes readily under the category of QR-triggered lobbying, for she is 
concerned generically with lobbying activities that are prompted by the 
existence of QRs and licenses, whereas her specific analysis relates to import 
quotas. As such, the phrase ‘rent-seeking’ should apply to simply one, and 
possibly small, subset of DUP activities in the real world.’ 
6The word ‘directly’ is necessary since, in the inherently second-best cases noted below, DUP 
activities may be (indirectly) benelicial. See the extended conceptual discussion in Bhagwati 
(1982). 
‘It is not clear to me that the Marshallian notion of ‘rent’ is readily extendable to all classes 
of DUP activities, even if one were willing to overlook the fact that Krueger used the phrase to 
categorise only the subset of QR-triggered lobbying activities. Furthermore, I have the rather 
different problem with the focus on rents in thinking about DUP activities, that rents arise also 
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factor supplies in full employment, each factor earns only rents since the minimum supply price 
of the factors is zero. Thus, focussing on rents does not help to distinguish between DUP and 
traditional non-DUP activities, which I presume is what one wants to do. Hence, the phrase 
‘DUP activities’ seems the logical candidate, in focussing directly on the relevant essence of such 
activities. 
I also note with pleasure that Tullock does approve of the phrase DUP (pronounced as 
‘dupe’). As for his fear that it may be too late to have it adopted, I think that this may be too 
pessimistic. It has already begun to gain currency in the trade-theoretic literature, as in Anam 
(1982). 
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